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Intra-Regional Balance of Power and Economic Integration: The Origins 
of the European Community*
Sang Soo Lim and Iordanka Alexandrova**
What made possible the voluntary formation of the European Community? The answer to this 
question lies in the distribution of capabilities in Europe after the end of World War II. Centralized 
integration took place because three conditions occurred at the same time. First, the emergence of the 
Soviet Union as an overwhelming symmetrical common threat to France, West Germany, Italy, and 
the Benelux gave them incentive to cooperate. Second, the aggregate power of the threatened states 
was sufficient to counter the threat. Third, no single state within the balancing coalition was more 
powerful than all the others taken together. This allowed them to surrender decision-making authority 
over important economic sectors to supranational institutions without concern that these would be 
dominated by a single state.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The history of Europe is a history of conflict. Mutual fear, suspicion, and hatred have 
hampered cooperation and bred war on the Old Continent for as long as written records 
tell. Yet, as the dust of  World War II settled, the bellicose European states buried their 
animosities, reconciled, and laid the foundations of a new type of economic community. 
In 1951, France and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) first agreed to combine their 
heavy industries.1 Joined by Italy and the Benelux states (Belgium, the Netherlands, and 
Luxemburg) the former enemies met in Paris to sign the treaty establishing a European 
Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) “based on a common market, common objectives, and 
common institutions” (ECSC, 1951). Soon after, in 1957, the six states took another major 
step toward an economic union with the signing of the Treaty of Rome, establishing the 
European Economic Community (EEC). Europeans chose to form an economic coalition by 
surrendering decision-making power to a central authority. This unprecedented move required 
each of them to trust a long-time enemy with the right to influence important aspects of its 
economic policy. Following their footsteps, many regions around the world have attempted 
to deepen economic cooperation, but none have been as successful as Europe. How did the 
European states overcome their mutual distrust? What made possible the voluntary formation 
of the ECSC in 1951 and the EEC in 1957?
Answering these questions is important because economic cooperation has become 
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essential for state peace and prosperity. Regional powers must work with each other to be 
able to compete with the economies both of dominant states and of an increasing number of 
regional blocs with various degrees of integration and development. For example, the full 
potential for cooperation between states in Northeast Asia could be achieved only if they are 
able to reconcile as the European states did (see Calder and Fukuyama, 2008).
We argue that European integration became possible as a result of three conditions that 
applied simultaneously in the region after the end of World War II. First, the Soviet Union 
presented a significant threat to the six continental Western European states. As none of them 
had sufficient resources to effectively balance internally against it, they had strong incentive 
to form a defensive coalition to contain the opponent. Second, the combined economies of 
the Six had the potential to match the power of the rising hegemon when closely integrated 
and functioning as a single industrial base. Third, no single state among them was powerful 
enough to dominate a multilateral organization and impose its preferences on the other 
five members. This led each country to believe that it could surrender decision-making 
authority over important sectors of the economy without concern that the ECSC or EEC 
would become tools of control for one strongest state. The first two conditions gave the Six 
strong motivation to integrate parts of their economies in an attempt to balance the common 
adversary. The absence of a dominant power among them allowed the effort to succeed.
Our argument presents a modification of Sebastian Rosato’s work explaining European 
integration as balancing against a powerful competitor (Rosato, 2011). We revise his 
approach by highlighting the importance of the distribution of capabilities among the original 
member-states for their initial decision to pursue integration. Specifically, we show that the 
absence of a dominant power among the six Western European states was vital for their 
decision to form a coalition. Our analysis thus refines Rosato’s theoretical model suggesting 
that internal power dynamics only affect the format of cooperation (integration or unification) 
after the decision to form a coalition has been made (Rosato, 2011: 31). Using primary and 
secondary sources, we account for the considerations of both major and minor states in 
choosing integration as a strategy to address their security concerns.
The next section of the article lays out the logic of our explanation and develops the 
argument about states’ considerations of relative power and their impact on the willingness to 
integrate. The third section applies this theoretical framework to explain why the six original 
member states decided to join the ECSC and proceeded to form the EEC. The last section 
summarizes the findings and based on them offers implications for regional integration theory 
and practice. 
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORk
Centralized integration can take place when three conditions simultaneously occur in a 
region. First, the emergence of an overwhelming symmetrical common threat provides the 
motive for cooperation. Second, the aggregate power of the threatened states is sufficient to 
counter the threat. Third, no single state within the balancing coalition is more powerful than 
all the other members taken together. 
2.1. Overwhelming Symmetrical Common Threat as Motive for Cooperation
Common security threats shape the trajectory of cooperation between states. When facing 
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a powerful opponent, states seek ways to increase their power in order to guarantee their 
survival (Mearsheimer, 2001: 156; Snyder, 1997: 43; Walt, 1987:18). Threatened countries 
have two ways of matching the power of an adversary—mobilizing resources to increase 
their own capabilities (internal balancing) and joining forces with other threatened countries 
(external balancing; Mearsheimer, 2001: 156–157). Depending on the depth of cooperation, 
external balancing can be further divided into two subtypes: alliance and integration 
(Parent, 2011: 9; Rosato, 2011: 25–26). The difference between alliance and integration is 
that the former constitutes an intergovernmental agreement to coordinate policy, while the 
latter entails surrendering policymaking authority in certain policy areas to a supranational 
organization.
States choose their balancing strategy depending on the level of threat that they face. 
They are generally averse to defense cooperation as it entails risks of abandonment and 
entrapment in conflicts over foreign interests (Snyder, 1984). When the adversary has similar 
capabilities to their own and security can be achieved through domestic mobilization of 
resources states prefer to balance internally. When facing a superior opponent whose power 
can only be matched by joining forces with others, leaders accept the risks of cooperation and 
form alliances (Mearsheimer, 1989: 156). If the common threat is overwhelming, states can 
further increase their aggregate power by integrating their economic or military capabilities. 
In the anarchic international system, there is no guarantee that the supranational organization 
controlling the merged resources will remain impartial and act for the mutual benefit of all 
member states. Consequently, integration is the least preferable balancing strategy, because it 
goes against a state’s desire to control its own policy and resources (Rosato, 2011: 30). 
Integration becomes an acceptable defense strategy when the threat is too great to be 
addressed by internal balancing or an inter-state alliance. The reason is that integration is 
a more effective way of balancing than the alternatives (Rosato, 2011: 28–31). Through 
collective management of resources states can achieve better efficiency and increase their 
aggregate power. Moreover, integration allows for the benefits of economies of scale, such as 
lower costs of production, which lead to higher economic growth (Moravcsik, 2013: 35–41). 
Such advantages are unobtainable through internal balancing or alliances: the amount of 
resources that a state can mobilize for internal balancing is fundamentally limited, while 
alliances lack the supranational organizations allowing efficient policy coordination.
To provide sufficient impetus for integration the potential aggressor should enjoy 
approximately a three to one power advantage over each individual threatened state.2 The 
three-to-one ratio is a widely accepted estimate because often the attacker is at a natural 
disadvantage against the defender and needs at least thrice more power at the attacking 
point to achieve victory (Mearsheimer, 1989; Rosato, 2011: 26). In other words, when the 
adversary enjoys a smaller advantage than this, either internal balancing or allied resistance 
would be sufficient to deter or defend against an attack. However, if the aggressor outweighs 
each target by a margin of three to one, integration becomes an acceptable option, preferable 
to being dominated by an adversarial power.
Finally, integration can occur only if the common threat is symmetrical for all potential 
members of a prospective defensive community.3 If the threat is asymmetrical (i.e. if some 
2 The power ratio here is based on the combination of total military and economic assets that a state 
and its adversary has at hand, as we are interested in the overall balance of power between the two.
3 We accept Stephen Walt’s (1987) view that a state’s level of threat is determined by the opponent’s 
aggregate power, offensive power, geographic proximity, and aggressive intentions.
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states feel less threatened than others) those that feel more threatened will prefer to pursue 
integration, while the less concerned ones will have incentives to avoid it. As a result, an 
asymmetrical threat will create divergent preferences among the states in the region over the 
necessity of integration for balancing. In this case, the less threatened states would rather 
pass the buck of restraining the opponent to the more threatened ones (who could proceed 
to integrate among themselves) or pursue an alternative defense arrangement (such as an 
alliance that does not require relinquishing of sovereignty). If the participation of the less 
threatened states is essential for successful balancing through integration, the integrative 
effort is likely to fail. 
2.2. Sufficient Aggregate Power for Balancing through Integration
Another condition necessary to provoke integration is that the threatened states have 
enough aggregate power for successful balancing (Rosato, 2011: 26–27). If the adversary’s 
offensive capabilities are so overwhelming that a defensive coalition is unlikely to prevail 
in a conflict, states will have little incentive to cooperate (Walt, 1987: 29). Leaders need 
to believe that the merging of their countries’ resources will make it possible to counter 
the threat before engaging in costly integrative efforts. Based on the logic described in the 
preceding subsection, a coalition will be able to balance when its aggregate capabilities 
amount to more than one-third of the threatening state’s power. When the combined power 
of the threatened states is estimated to be above this threshold, they will pursue integration 
believing that it will allow them to successfully deter or defend against the adversary. 
Conversely, if the combined capabilities of all target states are less than one third of those of 
the threat, they will seek other ways to preserve their sovereignty. 
The aggregate capabilities of a coalition consist of military and latent power (economic 
and demographic; see Mearsheimer, 2001: 55–82). To increase their aggregate capabilities 
and remain competitive against the adversary states can integrate parts of their militaries, 
economies, or both. In general, leaders prefer to keep integration to a minimum considering 
its downsides: restricted policy autonomy and potential opportunities for other members to 
gain unfair advantages from cooperation (see Snyder, 1997: 44). Therefore, states pursue 
only as much integration as necessary to maintain aggregate capabilities sufficient for 
balancing. In addition, they are averse to merging sectors where the surrendering of policy 
autonomy could create additional security risks (Rosato, 2011: 34). Economic integration is 
thus preferable to military integration, because economic policy rarely has immediate effects 
and states can back out of disadvantageous agreements before they produce negative security 
consequences. Military power, on the other hand, once put under the control of a common 
organization can potentially be used (or misused) immediately. As a result, states are reluctant 
to surrender vital defense assets to a supranational organization preferring to keep them under 
national control instead.
It follows that the scope of integration efforts is determined by the balance of power 
between the threatening state and the targets. States only merge sectors where integration 
improves their chances of competing against the adversary and avoid combining more sectors 
than necessary to achieve this aim. Integration proceeds in stages starting from the least risky 
areas of cooperation and can expand until the benefits of integrating an additional sector are 
offset by the downsides.
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2.3. Intra-regional Balance of Power
Finally, integration is only possible if no single state within the region is predominantly 
powerful. States facing a common threat and having sufficient power to balance against it 
have strong incentive to integrate. However, they also need to be relatively confident that 
the supranational organization controlling their merged resources will be managed for all 
members’ collective benefit, not an individual state’s particular interest. If a single state is 
powerful enough to take control over the organization, other states will decline to participate, 
because there is no guarantee that the dominant state will not abuse the collective resources 
to their detriment (on state concerns about relative gains see Grieco, 1988). Even if the 
dominant state has no intention to force its preferred policy upon other members at present, 
its behavior could change in the future should it become the master of the organization (see 
Jervis, 1978; Mearsheimer, 1994/95).
The most certain way to prevent the abuse of power is to include only those states that 
do not have the capacity to dominate an organization in the first place. Put simply, no single 
member state should have more power than all the other member states combined. When this 
is the case, members will have sufficient collective leverage to thwart attempts even from the 
relatively strongest state to hijack policymaking within the common institution. The balance 
of power within the region is therefore crucial for the relatively weaker states’ participation in 
integration efforts, for they cannot safely surrender policymaking authority to an organization 
that can potentially be dominated by a single state. Put differently, states are not likely to 
participate in cooperation that can lead to unification (defined as cooperation where “a single 
state makes policy for the entire group”; cf. Rosato, 2011: 15, 23). Voluntary integrative 
efforts are more likely to commence when potential participants are confident that they will 
retain control over the policies of the organization.
3. THE SUCCESS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
The European Union today presents a unique case of successful economic integration. 
The foundations of present day Europe, however, were laid in the first decade after the end of 
World War II when Belgium, France, West Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands 
cooperated to build the first institutions that allowed the region to enjoy decades of economic 
growth and the longest period of peace in the written history of the continent. Therefore, 
to probe the plausibility of our version of the realist theory of regional integration, in this 
section we turn to the period of formation of the ECSC and EEC.
3.1. Why European States Pursued Cooperation 
The original six member states of the ECSC and EEC were driven to cooperate by the 
need to defend against a rising common threat. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
(USSR) had emerged from the war as a potential hegemon, militarily and economically 
superior to the rest of Europe. By 1950, in terms of personnel and expenditure, the Soviet 
Armed Forces outmatched the French by a ratio of 9:1 (Rosato, 2011: 43–44). Four years of 
German occupation had left the former great power severely weakened and the war it started 
in Indochina in 1946 aggravated the situation. Having committed substantial resources 
to the losing conflict in the remote Southeast Asian region, the French were incapable of 
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balancing the Soviets by themselves (Hitchcock, 2004: 172–177). None of the other Western 
European powers had better prospects of matching the threat. Defeated in the war, Germany 
was without an army, economically devastated, and politically divided into two new de-
facto states, which stalled its potential for quick recovery (Urwin, 1995: 14). The remaining 
four states had militaries, which taken together constituted but a small fraction of the Soviet 
force (Rosato, 2011: 43–44). The USSR also had superior fighting capabilities, giving it 
an additional advantage (Rosato, 2011: 43, 45). None of the six continental powers had an 
industry capable of production matching the scale of the rich in resources and manpower 
competitor (Rosato, 2011: 44–45). Internal balancing was unattainable immediately after the 
end of the war and the prospects were the capabilities gap between the West and the East of 
Europe would only increase over time (Rosato, 2011: 45).
The leadership of the two European states with potential to be major powers—France and 
West Germany—recognized that they could not compete with the Soviet Union individually 
(MccGwire, 1987: 2). Western states likely perceived Soviet power to be even greater than it 
actually was, particularly in the years immediately after the end of the war (MccGwire, 1987: 
2). French policymakers were deeply concerned about their own ability to stop the threat. 
The head of the Provisional Government of the French Republic Charles de Gaulle thought it 
“very possible that Russia will take over the entire continent of Europe in due course,” while 
his Foreign Minister Georges Bidault asked, “Who is going to stop Attila; he is covering 
more territory every day” (quoted in Creswell and Trachtenberg, 2003: 8). The Chancellor 
of the FRG, konrad Adenauer felt that the “threat to German security was so great that the 
West Germans needed to do whatever the allies would let them do” to defend against it 
(Trachtenberg, 1999: 112). In his memoirs Adenauer wrote that “no single European country 
could guarantee a secure future to its people by its own strength.” Regarding West Germany, 
he added, “We were a small and very exposed country. […] By our own strength we could 
achieve nothing” (Adenauer, 1966: 416). 
The minor powers harbored no illusions about their own vulnerability.4 In 1947, uncertain 
that Italy would be able to handle a rebellion instigated by Italian communists, then Prime 
Minister Alcide De Gasperi contacted the French authorities to ask for cooperation in 
averting the domestic crisis. Commenting on Italy’s ability to handle the situation, the US 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) concluded that “In view of the existing inadequacies in 
arms and equipment of the Italian Army and security troops […] the Italian government 
would probably not be able to regain control of North Italy unaided” if the Italian Communist 
Party (ICP) received outside support (CIA, 1997). Overall, the Italian Armed Forces’ ability 
to defend the nation against a much more potent foreign military threat was questionable at 
best (Varsori, 1992: 263–266). Weaker than Italy, the Benelux states also recognized that they 
did not have resources for balancing. 
The Western world perceived Soviet intentions to be hostile and aggressive (Heuser, 
1991). In 1946, the American diplomat George kennan wrote an analysis of Soviet policy 
(known as the “long telegram”) where he concluded that the USSR did not envision “peaceful 
coexistence” with capitalist states (kennan, 1946). The telegram was accepted in Washington 
as a basis for a new US policy of a global containment of the USSR (Fenby, 2018: 44–45). 
Soon after Winston Churchill delivered his “iron curtain” speech, which defined the Soviet 
4 We categorize Italy as a minor power, because it had little potential to dominate European 
institutions, although its capabilities place it closer to France and West Germany than to any of the 
Benelux states throughout the entire studied period.
INTRA-REGIONAL BALANCE OF POWER AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 23
threat and had a strong impact on public opinion across Western Europe. In 1948, a US 
policy paper concluded that Soviet leaders pursued “the political conquest of western 
Europe” and intended to achieve it through “political, economic, and psychological warfare 
against all elements resistant to communist purposes, and in particular attempting to prevent 
or retard the recovery of and cooperation among western European countries” (Heuser, 1991: 
20; NSC, 1948). Bidault expressed Paris’ concurrence with this concern when he appealed 
for a formal treaty with the United States based on the understanding that “the Soviet menace 
now threatened the whole of Western Europe” (Fenby, 2018: 371). German leaders also saw 
the USSR as a serious threat (Rosato, 2011: 72–73). For Adenauer, “The aim of the Russians 
was unambiguous. Soviet Russia had, like Tsarist Russia, an urge to acquire or subdue new 
territories in Europe” (Adenauer, 1966: 78). He worried that the European balance of power 
had been destroyed by the war and that Western Europe had become vulnerable to Moscow’s 
ambitions (Adenauer, 1966: 319).
The minor states shared the apprehensions of Paris and Bonn. Fear of the Soviet 
Union and its growing influence was most prevalent in Italy where the ICP came close to 
overthrowing De Gasperi’s government and taking power over the newly democratic state (J. 
E. Miller, 1983). The other three nations also saw Communist expansion as an ever-present 
danger. In September 1948, when he was Prime Minister of Belgium, Paul-Henri Spaak 
gave the famous “speech of fear” at the United Nations where he eloquently summarized 
Western Europe’s perceptions of threat. “There is only one great power that exited the war 
having conquered foreign territories, and this great power is the USSR,” he said and added 
addressing the representatives of the Soviet Union: “The truth is that your foreign policy is 
today bolder and more ambitious than the policies of the Tsars themselves” (Spaak, 1980). 
The realization of this threat is what had led in 1948 to the signing by Britain, France, and 
the Benelux of the Brussels Pact—the defense agreement that would become the foundation 
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1949 (where Italy became a founding member 
and the FRG joined in 1955; Hitchcock, 2004: 64–65).
Finally, Europeans had well-founded doubts about the will of the US to participate in 
the defense of the Old Continent (Rosato, 2011: 52). The opinion that American forces 
should be withdrawn and Europe left to balance the Soviets by itself had many supporters 
in Washington (Trachtenberg, 1999: 114). Particularly before 1950, when the korean War 
created a sense of imminent threat of Communist aggression and prompted an expansion 
of American commitments, the US planned for very limited involvement in Europe against 
the Soviets. Washington intended to interfere only when its help “could make the difference 
between success and failure” for a state that was already capable of fighting off the threat on 
its own (Jervis, 1980: 574). European leaders were without doubt aware of US reasoning. 
French policy was therefore focused on preparing for the possibility that America could 
consider retreating from Europe (Rosato, 2011: 52). Adenauer’s self-proclaimed motto at the 
same time was “Help yourself and the United States will help you” (Adenauer, 1966: 417). 
With such considerations in mind, Western European leaders made the first moves toward 
cooperation to counter the rising threat. 
3.2. Why European States Chose to Balance through Economic Integration
Taken together, the continental states could hope to compete against the Soviet Union 
in economic development. In the decade between 1947 and 1957, the aggregate economic 
power of France, West Germany, and the four minor states roughly equaled that of the 
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adversary (Rosato, 2011: 44). Thus the combined economic capabilities of the six Western 
European states were sufficient to match the economic potential of their common competitor. 
Since the aggregate economic power of the coalition was enough to allow successful 
balancing, it provided the rationale to attempt to cooperate to counter the threat. 
European leaders realized that simple economic policy coordination would not be 
sufficient to outmatch Soviet potential. The belief that European states only had a chance to 
resist domination by engaging in closer cooperation with one another was prevalent among 
Western European policymakers in the years after World War II. In 1947, Charles De Gaulle 
stated that for France to avoid conflict with the Soviets, Europe needed to be “organized into 
a single system” (cited in Rosato, 2011: 61). A group of French political elites produced a 
leaflet arguing that integration was the only way for Europe to survive Russian expansionism 
(Rosato, 2011: 62). Then French Prime Minister Antoine Pinay thought that “if we are 
caught between the two giants of the last war, we shall be crushed, while if we are united, 
we could talk as equals to equals” (quoted in Girault, 1992: 83). His successor, Guy Mollet, 
also supported centralized European community based on balance-of-power considerations 
(Rosato, 2011: 185). Jean Monnet—the creator of the ECSC and EEC—explained his 
reasoning in the post-war years: European countries could not “go beyond recovery towards 
steady expansion” individually; they could grow their economies only “if conditions were 
created enabling those countries to increase their resources by merging them in a large and 
dynamic common market” (Monnet, 1963: 205). As West Germany needed time to recover 
after the war, joining forces with others was viewed in Bonn as a way to simultaneously 
reconcile with former enemies in the west and balance against the east (Rosato, 2011: 73, 
80). Adenauer promoted the idea that “Europeans have to unite in some form” and believed 
that integration was crucial for the economic reconstruction of Europe (Dülffer, 2007). As 
early as 1945 he wrote, “In the long run, the French and Belgian demand for security can 
only be met by the economic integration of western Germany, France, Belgium, Luxemburg 
and Holland” (Adenauer, 1966: 36).
Support for integration was even stronger among the weaker Western European countries. 
Italian decision-makers, including De Gasperi and the Minister of Foreign Affairs Carlo 
Sforza, viewed European integration as a way to supplement Italy’s weakened power 
and restore Italy to prosperity (M. Miller, 1995: 57). The Benelux states were the first to 
pursue cooperation through the Treaty of London in 1944, which was aimed at establishing 
a Benelux customs union—an “integrative organization” that would contribute to their 
collective economic growth (Bleich, 1948; Soetendorp, 2014: 35). Seeing wider membership 
as more beneficial and less prone to failure, they soon proposed cooperation on a broader 
scale, including France, West Germany, and possibly Britain (Soetendorp, 2014: 35–36). The 
Benelux agreed that they needed assistance from regional major powers in order to effectively 
protect themselves. At the signing of the Statute of the Council of Europe in 1949, then 
Luxembourg Foreign Minister Joseph Bech stated, “Europe must unite, if she is to survive 
and to maintain in the post-war world the glorious place which has been hers throughout the 
history of humanity” (Bech, 1949). As Pierre-Henri Laurent attests, “Most Lowlanders by the 
mid-fifties felt strongly the necessity to protect their sovereignty by renouncing it” (Laurent, 
1970: 376). 
The understanding that economic cooperation needs to take the form of integration to 
maintain competitiveness against the Soviet Union was prevalent among decision-makers in 
continental Western Europe in the late 1940s and early 1950s. As a Luxembourg newspaper 
reported about the first Congress of the European Movement in March 1949, prominent 
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representatives of Western European states emphasized in many different ways “the need for 
Europe to unite or perish” (Demeuse, 1949). Integration, however, was not the only option 
available to each individual European state and there were many domestic actors (particularly 
in France, West Germany, and Italy) who opposed the idea of united Europe and advocated 
for alternative solutions, such as preserving neutrality (Bindi, 2009: 11–12; M. Miller, 1995: 
58). The decision to join the common institutions followed a bargaining process, where each 
state weighted the benefits of integration against its inherent risks. 
3.3 Why European States Agreed to Build Supranational Institutions
The main problem faced by Western Europeans regarding regional integration was 
achieving balance of power within a coalition consisting of states with asymmetric 
capabilities. Although they realized that balancing the Soviet Union would be impossible 
without involving West Germany, France, Italy, and the Benelux were aware of the dangers 
of reviving the beaten aggressor and accepting it within the new regional order (Fenby, 
2018: 258–259; Jervis, 1980: 569). If the FRG was allowed to rebuild its industry, it had 
the potential to achieve quick economic recovery, overtake the victors, and likely threaten 
them once again possibly in coalition with the Soviets. The Germans, on their side, worried 
about French dominance over their recovering industry. Yet, the regional balance of power 
after the end of World War II worked to increase the chances of cooperation—because none 
of the participants was predominantly strong, European powers felt reassured that the new 
organizations will not be dominated by a single state’s interests as integration went ahead. 
This favorable distribution of power was most clearly reflected in the negotiations leading 
to the formation of the first European institutions. No single state could force its preferences 
regarding the format of cooperation upon all others and this allowed them to negotiate a 
mutually acceptable outcome.
French policymakers believed that the distribution of capabilities in Europe allowed the 
German threat to be contained within the framework of regional institutions. Throughout, 
Monnet planned for France to take the lead in controlling West Germany’s revival through 
economic cooperation (Gillingham, 2004: 144). Robert Schuman, another key architect 
of European integration, argued that recovering the German economy was necessary for 
balancing, but France needed to harness West Germany lest it became France’s rival and even 
its “master” (Rosato, 2011: 66). Pinay reportedly agreed that “a common market designed 
along lines acceptable to the Germans would pose a serious threat to the French economy” 
(Rosato, 2011: 193). The French were thus “prepared to endorse integration only if special 
arrangements could be made” to maintain French economic power within the EEC (Rosato, 
2011: 192).
The minor states were also concerned about West Germany’s return to power. Belgium, 
the Netherlands, and Luxemburg issued a joint statement in 1947, proposing that “the 
requisite control measures are taken to prevent the recurrence of the German threat.” The 
document advised against stimulating the German economy with aid “which would give it 
an advantage over the economies of the Allied nations” but did not object to the economic 
reconstruction of West Germany per se (Luxemburger Wort, February 26, 1948). Despite their 
concerns, the Benelux chose to join the negotiations regarding the formation of a cooperative 
economic agreement that would include West Germany. With the support of Paris, they could 
hope to successfully restrain Bonn if it attempted to push policy in an unfavorable direction.
The official blueprint for integration came from Paris. In 1950, Schuman made public 
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Monnet’s idea to merge the coal and steel industries of Western European states and place 
them under the control of an “impartial high authority.” The plan would make it possible to 
revive West Germany’s productive capabilities and guarantee that they could not be used to 
threaten France or any other member of the international organization that would govern their 
use (Hitchcock, 2003: 65–66). The proposed organizational structure would allow to preserve 
the organization’s impartiality. The high authority would “work for a balanced relationship” 
in Western Europe, where the collective power of the other members would restrain German 
resurgence (Schwartz, 1995: 510). A Council of Ministers and a Common Assembly would 
protect the interests of each state and serve to check the power of the High Authority. An 
advisory Consultative Committee representing social interest groups and a Court of Justice 
would further restrict the ability of any single member to dominate policy-making within 
the ECSC (Urwin, 1995: 50). In addition, individual states would not be able to exercise 
excessive influence through financial contributions as the budget of the ECSC would be 
funded by direct tax on coal and steel production gathered from the producers (Urwin, 2014: 
100). This institutional design intended to maintain impartiality would later be preserved 
in the construction of the EEC. A Commission consisting of nine representatives (two 
each from France, West Germany, and Italy, and one each from the Benelux states) would 
administer the implementation of the Treaty of Rome, which established the EEC. Again, a 
Council of Ministers would give voice to the member governments in coordinating policy, 
bestowing each individual state with power to veto or delay the implementation of acts of 
which it disapproved. A Parliamentary Assembly (the future European Parliament) consisting 
of elected delegates from each state would serve as a consultative body with the power to 
dismiss the Commission. The EEC would also have a Court of Justice to handle disputes and 
be a “guardian of the Community” (Urwin, 2014: 106–107).
While the Schuman Plan would allow the FRG to join the “Western Club,” the terms of 
membership were not entirely satisfactory for the defeated state (Urwin, 2014: 82–84). On 
one side, the plan presented a chance to free West Germany from the restrictive International 
Authority for the Ruhr—the organization established to control German industry after the 
war (Urwin, 1995: 45). Yet, the Germans remained concerned that if they joined the proposed 
organization, France would gain disproportional influence over the common institutions. 
Bonn could not bargain to be given more power than the other members, since this would 
have raised suspicions of renewed ambition to dominate Europe (Rosato, 2011: 80–81; 
Urwin, 2014: 82–84). What West Germany wanted was an institution that would remove the 
obstacles to its economic development and allow it to maintain parity with the other Western 
European powers. For instance, German policymakers hoped for limiting the competencies of 
the High Authority and leaving its producers to work in conditions of free market competition 
(CVCE, 2013; 2016b).
West Germany accepted the Schuman plan after being reassured that its industry will not 
be subject to unrestrained supranational intervention (George, 1985: 5). Adenauer’s fear that 
joining the ECSC could mean surrendering control over the German coal and steel sectors 
to its former adversaries was resolved by the French accepting revisions to the original 
Schuman Plan (Adenauer, 1966: 1946; Urwin, 2014: 82–84). Most importantly, France 
agreed to the creation of a Council of Ministers to scrutinize the High Authority. The resulting 
institutional structure (backed also by the Benelux) reduced the possibility that France would 
dominate decision-making within the Community (George, 1985: 5). The FRG’s support for 
the EEC followed a similar line of reasoning. As the State Secretary at the Foreign Office 
Walter Hallstein (who went to become the first president of the Commission of the European 
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Economic Community) explained, West Germany had no choice but to agree to the terms that 
limited its power in the EEC or be suspected of having hegemonic ambitions (Rosato, 2011: 
205–206). Consequently, the Germans conceded to French demands in connection with the 
organization of the EEC after making sure that their equal rights were guaranteed.
The four minor states also accepted the Schuman Plan after successfully negotiating 
satisfactory assurances that European institutions would not be dominated by a single 
state. From the onset, Italy demanded equal status in the ECSC, even though its economy, 
marred by unemployment and “the highest tariff barriers in Western Europe” was much 
less competitive than the French or German’s (Dedman, 2010: 92). At the Schuman Plan 
negotiations, Rome’s delegate Paolo Emilio Taviani stated that Italy was going to “fight hard 
to gain a position of equality” (Ranieri, 1988: 348). As then Prime Minister of Italy Mario 
Scelba stated at the Council of Foreign Relations in 1955, the “disadvantageous position in 
which Italy is placed […] demonstrates that the Italian problems must be dealt with in the 
context of international cooperation.” The Italians, he added, “would not tolerate Germany 
becoming another Great, remaining ourselves in an inferior position” (quoted in Vigezzi, 
1992: 103, emphasis in original). Thus Italy’s agreement to join European institutions became 
conditional on assurances that the impartiality of the ECSC and EEC would not be threatened 
by any single state. 
Rome’s demands were accepted and reflected in the design of European institutions. In the 
ECSC, the High Authority guaranteed Italy’s equal status and power as the Germans and the 
French (Urwin, 2014: 48–50). In the EEC, Italian concerns about the impact of cooperation 
with major industrial powers on its relatively weak economy were addressed with several 
special provisions. Among them were the establishment of a European Investment Bank 
and a European Social Fund, which intended to provide economic assistance to the less 
competitive firms and unemployed workers in Western Europe. The new institutions were 
included in an appendix to the Treaty of Rome under the name of “Protocol Concerning 
Italy,” which was intended to be the primary beneficiary (Perron, 2004: 72). The Italians also 
gained the right to appoint two members in the Commission—the same as the economically 
stronger neighbors (Urwin, 1995: 80–81). 
The Benelux states, with their weak power positions, were particularly sensitive on the 
issue of European institutions’ impartiality. They remained apprehensive about having to 
accommodate the policy preferences of the economically superior West Germany and France 
(Gillingham, 2004: 247). The three countries expected their influence within the organizations 
to be guaranteed and for French and German powers to be limited. When preparing for 
negotiations for the establishment of the ECSC, Dutch, Belgian, and Luxembourg officials 
met to discuss a common position regarding the Schuman Plan. They agreed on opposition 
to “a High Authority which would take final decisions without the scrutiny, for example, of 
an international parliament” and call for “equal representation for all the countries” in its 
board, among other measures to demand to safeguard the interests of the weaker participants 
(CVCE, 2016c). Later, the Benelux became actively involved in the formation and design 
of the ECC. In 1955, Joseph Bech, Paul-Henri Spaak, and Johan Willem Beyen—foreign 
ministers respectively of Luxembourg, Belgium, and the Netherlands—presented a joint 
memorandum to France, West Germany, and Italy urging the expansion of the ECSC to 
more fields. The text emphasized that “convinced that independent institutions were a 
guarantee for the smaller countries, the Three stressed the need for a joint authority with 
powers of its own” (CVCE, 2016d). The proposal was discussed at the Messina Conference 
in 1955, attended by all six members of the ECSC (CVCE, 2016a). The Benelux idea of 
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“constructing a plan in which various national interests and pressures could be overridden by 
an esprit communitaire, based on potent institutional devices like the High Authority of the 
ECSC” contradicted at the time with French, German, and even Italian skepticism regarding 
supranationalism. An International Committee headed by Spaak was delegated to prepare 
the draft agreements addressing these and other issues needed to set up a common European 
market (Laurent, 1970: 378–379, emphasis in original). The so called “Spaak Report” 
produced by the Committee meticulously addressed each state’s particular concerns and thus 
became the foundation of the EEC (Laurent, 1970: 381–383).
The Benelux succeeded in winning concessions regarding their status in the ECSC 
and EEC (Dedman, 2010: 62; Gillingham, 2004: 247–249). Ultimately, Monnet had to 
agree to offer “special deals” to each of the minor powers to reassure them and elicit their 
participation in the Schuman Plan (Gillingham, 2004: 247). These included granting one 
seat in the High Authority to each of the three states, the establishment of the Council of 
Ministers that allowed them to have the same institutional power as the other members, 
providing subsidies to their steel and coal sectors, and adopting a weighted voting system in 
the Common Assembly that prevented the monopoly of power by France or West Germany. 
Later, the FRG agreed to allow Belgium and Netherlands special status over their connections 
with the overseas territories as well (Urwin, 1995: 72–75). This comes to show that the minor 
powers had significant bargaining clout of their own, amplified by close policy coordination 
among themselves. France and West Germany accommodated the weaker states’ demands 
because their participation was important for the success of the coalition.
In sum, each of the Six agreed to join European institutions after its concerns about the 
format of cooperation had been sufficiently addressed. Each state was sufficiently confident 
that given the distribution of capabilities at that time, none of the major powers would be 
able to dominate the new coalition and enrich itself at the expense of the other members. 
The minor states did not fear being subdued to the interests of either France or Germany as 
they could side with one powerful partner each time the other made a threatening move. In a 
similar way, by securing the membership of the minor states, each of the two major powers 
could rely on their support to restrain the other.
It follows that the balanced distribution of power in Western Europe is what allowed the 
creation of impartial European institutions. The ability of all six states to negotiate and have 
their respective positions taken into account was decisive for the success of initial integration 
efforts. Should one state have been overwhelmingly powerful, the others would have opted 
out of the ECSC and the EEC would have never been envisioned.
4. CONCLUSION
This article has explained what made possible the voluntary creation of European 
regional institutions in the 1950s. It has shown that states were able to overcome their mutual 
distrust because three conditions applied simultaneously in the region after the end of World 
War II. First, the Soviet Union emerged as an overwhelming common threat to France, 
West Germany, Italy, and the three Benelux states motivating them to pursue cooperation 
to balance against the potential aggressor. Second, the six states believed that together they 
had the potential to match the power of the rising hegemon when closely integrated and 
functioning with a single industrial base. Third, the symmetrical distribution of capabilities 
among the Six allowed them to surrender decision-making authority over important sectors 
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of the economy without concern that European institutions would become a tool of control 
for one strongest state.
Our analysis addresses several weaknesses of Sebastian Rosato’s account of European 
integration. According to Rosato (2011), the Soviet threat prompted Western Europeans to 
integrate as a way of balancing. To present meaningful resistance against the Soviets, “the 
Europeans would have to establish a single military and economy,” which required “the 
creation of a central governing authority” (Rosato, 2011: 2). Cooperation took the form 
of integration (instead of unification) because “France and Germany were fairly evenly 
matched” and saw joint leadership as the best way to prevent each other from dominating the 
region (Rosato, 2011: 3).
This explanation is incomplete in two main regards. First, it does not focus on perceptions 
of threat, especially within the balancing coalition, which as seen in the preceding discussion, 
were important for alliance decisions. Second, Rosato leaves the relatively weaker states 
out of the discussion. Thus, the decisions of Italy and the Benelux to voluntarily surrender 
decision-making authority to an organization that can easily be dominated by West Germany 
or France remain unexplained. West Germany, in particular, presented a great potential threat 
to the minor states due to its capabilities, geographic proximity, and history of aggression 
(see Walt, 1987: 5). Integration with either major power could endanger the minor states’ 
sovereignty no less than occupation by Russian forces. In addition, France and West 
Germany’s reasons to satisfy the minor powers’ demands with regard to the institutional 
design of the new organizations to secure their participation in the coalition remain puzzling.
The present research offers a fuller account of the alliance choices of both major and 
minor states by highlighting their considerations of the distribution of power within the 
region. Contrary to Rosato’s view, integration only happened because none of the states had 
the potential to dominate the coalition; unification (where one state would be in charge of 
policy-making) was not an option that would have been accepted by any of the member states 
regardless of the overwhelming Soviet threat.
The theoretical framework used to explain the economic integration of continental 
Western Europe can be applied to account for the failure of military integration. Europe’s 
fear of Soviet military expansion (amplified by the break out of the korean War in 1950) 
provided the Six with a strong incentive to form a balancing coalition. The European states 
believed that they could build sufficient combined capabilities to give meaningful resistance 
to the USSR, provided that the US offered some assistance at least until the West German 
army was rebuilt (Rosato, 2011: 108–113). However, a European Defense Community failed 
to materialize. The main reason was likely that, as Churchill observed, “it was very difficult 
to overcome French fears of a revived German army” (Churchill, 2002: 960). Neither France, 
nor Italy and the Benelux could expect to contain a German military built to counter the 
USSR even if it was incorporated in a common European defense force. Consequently, they 
could not risk transferring control of their military forces to a supranational organization that 
could easily be dominated by West Germany.
The theory can also explain Great Britain’s decision not to become a partner in the 
Schuman Plan. The reason was that for Britain the benefits of integration would not have 
outweighed the costs. On one hand, London felt relatively less threatened by the USSR than 
the six continental states. In 1950, Britain generated “as much coal as all these countries 
together and about half as much steel” making it capable of matching Soviet production 
capabilities by itself (Het Vrije Volk, June 6, 1950). Britain was also shielded from the 
Soviet threat by the English Channel. On the other hand, if London joined the ECSC (and 
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later the EEC), it would have not only to surrender control of its coal and steel industry, but 
also to accept such policies as the adoption of common tariffs on non-member states, which 
would have hurt British exports. With such considerations in mind, it was unsurprising that 
“since 1945 the British have never wanted to go further than international cooperation, with 
individual governments retaining the last word” (Het Vrije Volk, June 6, 1950). Having opted 
out of integrating with the central European powers, by 1960, London had negotiated a 
separate trade bloc—the European Free Trade Association (EFTA)—with Austria, Denmark, 
Norway, Portugal, Sweden, and Switzerland, which offered an alternative to the EEC, without 
requiring political integration.
The above findings have implications for centralized cooperation and integration in other 
parts of the world. First, the rare combination of circumstances that led to the formation 
of the future EU is not currently present in any other region, and hence its results are 
unlikely to be replicated. Most importantly, member-states of such regional organizations 
as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations or MERCOSUR, for example, do not face 
an overwhelming common competitor perceived to have aggressive intentions that would 
provide sufficient motivation to pursue deeper integration. In addition, in regions where there 
is significant power asymmetry between states, cooperative efforts are even less likely to be 
successful as minor states would not be willing to enter organizations that could be easily 
dominated by their neighbors. 
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